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EVERETTIAN MECHANICS WITH HYPERFINITELY MANY WORLDS
JEFFREY BARRETT AND ISAAC GOLDBRING
Abstract. The present paper shows how onemightmodel Everettian quantum
mechanics using hyperfinitely many worlds. A hyperfinite model allows one
to consider idealized measurements of observables with continuous-valued
spectra where different outcomes are associated with possibly infinitesimal
probabilities. One can also prove hyperfinite formulations of Everett’s limiting
relative-frequency and randomness properties, theorems he considered central
to his formulation of quantum mechanics. Finally, this model provides an in-
tuitive framework in which to consider no-collapse formulations of quantum
mechanics more generally.
1. Everettian quantum mechanics and many worlds
Hugh Everett III (1956) (1957) presented pure wave mechanics as a solution
to the quantum measurement problem encountered by the standard collapse
theory.1 He characterized pure wave mechanics as the standard von Neumann-
Dirac formulation of quantummechanics butwithout any collapse of the quantum-
mechanical state on measurement or any other time. All physical systems al-
ways evolve in a deterministic, linear way described by the standard quantum
dynamics.
On Everett’s interpretation of the quantum-mechanical state, the linear dynam-
ics describes the universe as constantly splitting into branches or worlds cor-
responding to different measurement outcomes. How many worlds there are
and the state of each world depends on how one understands the global state.
Everett’s description of the principle of the relativity of states allows for arbi-
trary decompositions of the state, and he explicitly allowed for decompositions
in terms of eigenstates of observables with continuous-valued spectra. His dis-
cussion of relative states in the context of von Neumann’s account of a position
measurement, for example, involves a superposition of a continuous number of
branches, in each ofwhich the object systemhas a different determinate position
Goldbring was partially supported by NSF grant DMS-2054477.
1Barrett (2020, 42–53 and 105–17) for a detailed description of the standard collapse formula-
tion of quantum mechanics and the measurement problem and Barrett (2018) for an overview
of Everett’s project.
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(1957, 180–2). For this reason, he was careful to allow for informationmeasures
and probability distributions over sets of unrestricted cardinality in his theory
(1956, 86, 89–92). In brief, on Everett’s own presentation there is a potentially
uncountably infinite number of worlds depending on which decomposition of
the state one considers.
While Everett almost always referred to branches rather than worlds (and the
term “world” never appears in his written work), he explicitly endorsed there
being an uncountable number ofworlds in a recorded discussionwith colleagues
in 1962. He had been invited to describe his formulation of quantum mechan-
ics at a conference at Xavier University that had been convened to discuss the
quantum measurement problem. After Everett had briefly described how the
theory worked, the physicist Boris Podolsky said, “It looks like we would have
a non-denumerable infinity of worlds.” To which Everett responded, “Yes.”2
In contrast, Bryce Dewitt, perhaps Everett’s most energetic and effective pro-
ponent, held that since the correlations produced by measurement-like inter-
actions are always only approximate for observables with continuous spectra,
there must be at most a denumerable number of worlds.3 Indeed, DeWitt re-
peatedly suggested that the cardinally was large but finite, famously reporting
that there were 10100+ constantly splitting worlds.4
In the context of deocoherence formulations of Everettian quantummechanics,
the question of the number of worlds is more subtle. As particularly salient ex-
ample, DavidWallace has argued that since decoherence, the physical phenom-
ena that tends to prevent interference between branches, comes in degrees, there
is no simple matter of fact about how many worlds there are at a time. Rather,
how one individuatesworlds on a decohering-worlds account depends on one’s
level of description and practical interests.5 In order to prove the representa-
tion theorems that he wants for his decohering-worlds formulation of quantum
mechanics, Wallace explicitly rules out the possibility of positive infinitesimal
probabilities of the sort one would invariably encounter if one allowed for an
2Wendell Furry, one of the participants at the conference, replied that “I can think of various
alternative Furrys doing things, but I cannot think of a non-denumerable [infinity] of alternative
Furrys.” For a transcript of Everett’s description of his theory and the discussion that followed
see Barrett and Byrne (2012, 270–79).
3SeeDeWitt (1971, 210–11) inDeWitt andGraham (1973) for his account of themeasurement
of observables with continuous spectra.
4See DeWitt (1970, 33) and (1971, 179) for such claims and Becker (2018, 257–8) for a de-
scription of the sort of intuitions (things like being able to talk of the proportion of worlds with
a particular property) that might lead one to favor finitely many worlds over infinitely many
worlds.
5See Wallace (2012 99–102) for a brief introduction to the idea.
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infinite number of worlds.6 But on the pragmatic view of emergent worlds that
he has in mind, one arguably need never consider more than a finite number of
worlds in any case.
It is often convenient to suppose that there is a well-defined finite number of
worlds. This allows one to do things like consider the proportion of worlds
with a particular property or to consider unbiased probabilities over worlds,
something that cannot be done on the standard approach for even countably
infinite many worlds.7 The hyperfinite model we develop here allows one to
recover the intuitive features of finitely many worlds.
Our aim here is not to provide a once-and-for-all account of worlds for Ev-
erettian quantum mechanics. Rather, it is to suggest a way of reconstructing
Everett’s original picture of how branches work and a way of thinking of non-
denumerablymanyworlds andprobability distributions over suchworldswhen
it is convenient to do so. Specifically, a hyperfinite model allows one to consider
idealized measurements of observables with continuous-valued spectra and it
provides an intuitive set of tools for studying non-denumerable collections of
worlds. One can consider the proportion of worlds with a particular property
or consider unbiased probabilities over worlds in a perfectly natural way. It
also allows one to provide elegant nonstandard reformulations of the two lim-
iting properties that Everett took to be central to his formulation of quantum
mechanics. And it provides an intuitive context that works very much like a
finite-dimensional Hilbert space for representing no-collapse formulations of
quantum mechanics more generally.
2. worlds and probabilities
It will be helpful to start with a simple example of how pure wave mechanics
describes an idealmeasurement interactionwhere there are finitelymany (here,
two) possiblemeasurement outcomes. Suppose that an observer Fmeasures the
x-spin of a spin-1/2 system S that begins in the state
(1) α|↑x〉S + β|↓x〉S.
Let the state |“ready”〉F represent the state where F is ready to observe the x-spin
of S and record the result in her notebook. The initial state of the composite
system of F and S then is
(2) |“ready”〉F(α|↑x〉S + β|↓x〉S).
6See Wallace (2012, 227) and his discussion of decision theory in Appendix B.
7The discussion in Sebens and Carroll (2015) illustrates the intuitive appeal of considering
finitely many worlds.
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Since |“ready”〉F| ↑x〉S would evolve to |“↑x”〉F| ↑x〉S and |“ready”〉F| ↓x〉S would
evolve to |“↓x”〉F|↓x〉S on idealmeasurements, the initial state abovewould evolve
to the final post-measurement state
(3) α|“↑x”〉F|↑x〉S + β|“↓x”〉F|↓x〉S
by the linearity of the standard quantum dynamics.
Note that there is no collapse of the quantummechanical state here. Hence one
avoids the problem of having to say how and when such a random event might
occur. But while dropping the collapse dynamics from the standard collapse
theory allows one to provide a manifestly consistent account of an idealized
measurement interaction, it also immediately leads to two new problems. One
involves how one explains determinate records, the other how one understands
probabilities.
Since the final post-measurement state is not one where F has any determinate
measurement record at all on the standard eigenvalue-eigenstate rule for inter-
preting quantum-mechanical states, we need a newway to interpret states.8 On
the many-worlds interpretation of pure wave mechanics, easily the most pop-
ular way of understanding Everett’s theory, one understands each term of the
final state above as corresponding to a physical world, one for each possible re-
sult. Inasmuch as the post-measurement state describes one observer with the
result “↑x” and another observer with the result “↓x”, this interpretation of the
final state immediately solves the determinate-record problem.
While the standard collapse formulation of quantummechanics encounters the
quantum measurement problem and is hence ultimately unsatisfactory, it pre-
dicts precisely the right forward-looking probabilities for simple experiments
like this one. Here it predicts that F should expect to get the result “↑x” with
probability |α|2 and the result “↓x” with probability |β|2. That it predicts pre-
cisely the right forward-lookingprobabilities for such experiments iswhatmakes
the standard collapse theory one of the most successful physical theories ever.
These are the empirical predictions that one would like to recapture in any sat-
isfactory formulation of quantum mechanics. To address the probability prob-
lem, then, one needs to provide someway of understanding the standard quan-
tum probabilities in pure wave mechanics, a deterministic theory where every
physically possible measurement outcome is in fact fully realized as a world
characterized by a branch of the quantum mechanical state.
Self-location probabilities, probabilities that represent one’s epistemic uncer-
tainty of finding oneself with a particularmeasurement result, provide themost
8See Barrett (2020, 42–6) for a description of the standard interpretation of states.
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promising way to understand probabilities in a many-worlds theory.9 But how
one understands such probabilities depends on how one understands worlds
and how one understands self-location uncertainty in those worlds.
Suppose one pictures F’s premeasurementworld splitting into one copy for each
possible measurement result when F makes her measurement. On the face of
it, she should expect (with probability 1) to find one future copy of herself in
a world where she gets the result “↑x”, and she should expect (also with prob-
ability 1) to find another future copy of herself in a world where she gets the
result “↓x”. But these are entirely the wrong quantum probabilities.
The way one understands probabilities in a many-worlds theory depends on
the basic metaphysical picture one adopts for the worlds. Inasmuch as each of
the future copies of F have equal claim to being F on a splitting-worlds view,
she cannot make straightforward sense of standard forward-looking quantum
probabilities as subjective degrees of belief regarding which world she will in-
habit after she makes her measurement. That said, after she performs her mea-
surement and subsequently inhabits a world where there is now a single deter-
minate record, she can make perfectly good sense of quantum probabilities as
synchronic self-location probabilities.
Suppose Fmakes her measurement and suppose that her initial world has split
into one with a copy of F and her measuring device that records the result “↑x”
and another with a copy of F and her measuring device records the result “↓x”.
Consider one of the copies of F. Suppose that she has not yet looked at the result
that the measuring device in her world has recorded. F can now ask herself the
perfectly coherent synchronic question of what her degree of belief should be
that the recorded result in the world she inhabits right now is “↑x” and what
her degree of belief should be that the recorded result in her world is “↓x”.
While there is much to say about how one gets the values of such quantum
probabilities in a many-worlds theory, we will suppose here that one has a for-
mulation of the theory that stipulates that one should assign a subjective degree
of belief equal to the norm-squared of the amplitude associatedwith one’s post-
measurement world conditional on what one knows of one’s premeasurement
world.10 In the present case, since we are supposing that F begins ready to per-
form the described measurement, one wants one’s full theory to stipulate |α|2
as the probability of getting “↑x” and |β|2 the probability of getting “↓x”. Here
one is getting the standard quantum probabilities as synchronic self-location
9See Vaidman (2012) and (2014) for introductions to this approach. And Sebens and Carroll
(2015) for an example of a recent application of self-location probabilities.
10How quantum statistics worked for Everett had to do with the limiting relative-frequency
and limiting propertieswe discuss later in the paper. See Barrett (2020, 143–74) for a description
of how his understanding of quantum statistics might be reconstructed.
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probabilities rather than forward-looking probabilities regarding her outcome.
What F can say before performing her measurement is that each of her future
selves will have post-measurement synchronic self-location probabilities given
by the norm squared of the amplitude associated with each world. Of course,
the theory needs to tell one to assign these probabilities. To this end, one should
expect there to be auxiliary theoretical assumptions that go beyond just the uni-
tary dynamics that tell one how to assign self-locating probabilities.11
One can get something that is arguably closer to standard forward-looking quan-
tum probabilities by adopting a many-worlds theory where the worlds do not
split. Suppose that there is oneworld for every possible history or thread through
the branching structure generated by a series of subsequent measurements. On
this picture, there are two copies of F both before and after the measurement
interaction on the simple example above. One copy will get the result “↑x” and
the other will get the result “↓x”. Here one can take quantum probabilities to be
degrees of belief concerning which history or thread one inhabits. Even before
performing her measurement, F can coherently assign the standard forward-
looking quantum probabilities to the outcome as they are just the synchronic
self-location probabilities for her current inhabiting each of the two worlds.12
But again, one’s theory would need auxiliary theoretical assumptions that en-
tail that one assign these probabilities.
While there is more to say about how one might individuate worlds and un-
derstand probability in even the simple case with two possible measurement
results, this will serve for our present purposes. The hyperfinite approach that
we develop here can be applied to either splitting or non-splitting worlds. To
keep things simple, we will focus on splitting worlds.
The questionwe turn to now is how onemight understandworlds and probabil-
ities in the context of an idealized measurement of a physical observable with
a continuous spectrum. There are a number of possible approaches. One is
to allow a continuum of worlds and to consider a probability distribution over
these worlds analogous to how probability distributions over a continuum of
possible positions a single particle might occupy are treated in collapse theories
of quantum mechanics. Another alternative would be to fix some level of ap-
proximation and to consider finitely or countably many worlds corresponding
to the different possibilities of measuring the observable up to that fixed level
of approximation. Our approach here is along the lines of the latter method ex-
cept that our approximations yield infinitesimal error and hence do not rely on
11See Barrett (2020, 162-74) for a discussion of what such auxiliary assumptions might look
like. As a concrete example, Wallace (2010) provides a set of ten auxiliary assumptions that
together arguably entail the standard quantum probabilities.
12See the discussion of many-threads theories in Barrett (2020, 184–87).
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an arbitrary, nonphysical choice of precision in characterizing the worlds. The
model involves a hyperfinite number of worlds, each associated with a possibly
infinitesimal probability. We do not take this model to provide a canonical way
to address the representational problem, but we do take it to be a significant
virtue that it shares many of the intuitive features of finitely many worlds.
3. A brief introduction to nonstandard methods
The task at hand requires a few basic tools. The following prerequisites con-
cern the nonstandard methods we will use to characterize hyperfinitely many
worlds.13
The basic tenet of nonstandard analysis is to extend every set X under consid-
eration to a nonstandard extension ∗X which satisfies the following two prop-
erties: (1) ∗X has the same (first-order) logical properties as X14, and (2) ∗X
contains new “ideal” elements not present in the original set X.15 For example,
the field of hyperreals ∗R is a field extending the field R that shares the same
logical properties as the reals R (such as, for example, being an ordered field)
while containing new infinitesimal and infinite elements. Every finite (that
is, noninfinitesimal) element r of ∗R is infinitely close to a unique standard real
number, called the standard part of r, denoted st(r). In the sequel, we let fin(∗R)
denote the set of finite elements of ∗R. In general, for r, s ∈ ∗R, we write r ≈ s if
r and s are infinitely close to each other.
Since functions are certain kinds of sets, they also have nonstandard extensions.
Specifically, a function f : X → Y, identified with its graph, will be extended to
a subset of ∗X × ∗Y. It is easy to check that this nonstandard extension is itself
the graph of a function, which we abusively denote f : ∗X→ ∗Y (as it is readily
verified that it extends the original function f).
An important distinction between subsets of a nonstandard extension ∗X is the
internal vs. external distinction. Given any setX, we are entitled to consider the
nonstandard extension ∗P(X) of the powerset P(X) of X. Under a natural iden-
tification, we may view elements of ∗P(X) as actual subsets of ∗X; the sets thus
obtained are referred to as the internal subsets of ∗X. By the transfer principle,
internal subsets of ∗X have the same logical properties as ordinary subsets of X.
For example, internal subsets of ∗R that are bounded above have a supremum.
13See Goldblatt (1998) for a standard introductory text andGoldbring andWalsh (2019) for a
description of potential applications. For a text on nonstandard methods written for physicists
see Albeverio et. al. (1986).
14This fact is often called the transfer principle.
15The “number” of these new ideal elements is controlled by the saturation level of the non-
standard extension.
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This fact need not hold for external (that is, non-internal) subsets of ∗R, such as
the set of infinitesimal elements. Subsets of ∗X of the form ∗Y, where Y is a sub-
set of X, are internal subsets of ∗X, but not every internal subset of ∗X is of this
form. The internal definition principle states that a set defined using internal
parameters in a first-order way is once again internal. Consequently, finite sets
are always internal.
Using the internal definition principle, given N ∈ ∗N, the set of elements of
∗N between 1 andN is an internal subset of ∗N, suggestively denoted {1, . . . ,N}
(although it is not in fact finite if N is infinite). If a (necessarily internal) set E
is in internal bijection with the internal set {1, . . . ,N} for someN ∈ ∗N, then E is
called hyperfinite. Such anN is automatically unique and is called the internal
cardinality of E, suggestively denoted |E|. Finite sets are hyperfinite and their
internal cardinality agrees with the usual notion of cardinality. Hyperfinite sets
share many of the intuitive properties of finite sets. That said, if E is hyperfinite
but infinite, then its actual cardinality is at least the continuum and can be even
larger depending on the saturation properties of the nonstandard model. Such
will be the set of hyperfinitely many worlds corresponding to an observable
with a continuous spectrum. By the transfer princple, an internal subset of a
hyperfinite set is itself hyperfinite. By considering the nonstandard extension
of the summation function, one can make sense of hyperfinite sums
∑
x∈E f(x),
where E is a hyperfinite set and f is some internal function defined on E.
The Loeb measure construction will be used extensively throughout this paper.
Suppose that E is an internal set and µ is an internal finitely additive probability
measure defined on some internal algebra of internal subsets of E. Note that µ
takes values in ∗[0, 1]. It can be shown that the associated (genuine) finitely ad-
ditivemeasure F 7→ st(µ(F)) (defined on the same algebra as µ) can be extended
to a genuine (that is, σ-additive) probabilitymeasure µL on the σ-algebra gener-
ated by the original internal algebra. This measure is called the Loeb measure
associated to µ. An example of such an internal finitely additive probability
measure µ is the hyperfinite counting measure associated to a hyperfinite set: if
E is hyperfinite and F is an internal subset of E, then µ(F) := |F|
|E|
.
Internal Hilbert spaces play a central role in the present hyperfinite model. An
internal Hilbert space consists of an internal set H equipped with an internal
addition + : H×H → H, an internal scalar multiplication · : ∗C×H → H, and
an internal inner product 〈·|·〉 : H ×H → ∗C satisfying the usual Hilbert space
axioms.16 For |φ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H, we write |φ〉 ≈ |ψ〉 if ‖|φ〉 − |ψ〉‖ ≈ 0. By the trans-
fer principle, every internal Hilbert spaceH possesses an internal orthonormal
basis. If this internal orthonormal basis is actually hyperfinite, then we say that
the internal Hilbert spaceH is hyperfinite-dimensional. In this case, if (|ψi〉)i∈I
16Except that completeness gets replaced by internal completeness.
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is a (hyperfinite) orthonormal basis for H, then every element |φ〉 ∈ H can be
uniquely expressed as a hyperfinite sum |φ〉 =
∑
i∈I αi|ψi〉, where each αi ∈ ∗C.
4. continuous-valued observables and the hyperfinite model
4.1. Hyperfinite-dimensional state spaces. Everettian quantummechanics for
finite-dimensional state spaces as in the spin example above extends naturally
to the hyperfinite-dimensional setting. Fix a hyperfinite-dimensional Hilbert
spaceH and fix an observable B onH, which is an internally self-adjoint opera-
tor onH. The observable B is what determines what worlds there are at a time.
Depending on one’s formulation of the theory, itmight be a determinate-pointer
observable or determinate-record observable, or it might be selected by deco-
herence interactions or other dynamical considerations. Once specified, there is
an internal orthonormal basis (|ψi〉)i∈I of eigenvectors of Bwith corresponding
eigenvalues (λi)i∈I, where each λi ∈ ∗R. These eigenvalues correspond to the
determine measurement outcomes when measuring the observable B. The set
W of worlds thus coincides with the set {|ψi〉 : i ∈ I} of eigenstates of B. An
arbitrary state is simply a unit vector |φ〉 ∈ H and can be decomposed as a hy-
perfinite sum |φ〉 =
∑
i∈I αi|ψi〉 with each αi ∈ ∗C. In this state, the probability
of finding oneself in the world corresponding to |ψi〉 is the hyperreal number
|αi|
2 ∈ ∗R, which may be infinitesimal.17
The linear dynamics for the hyperfinite setting is analogous to the finite setting.
Specifically, if one fixes an internally self-adjoint operator T onH, the Hamilton-
ian for the system, then one can consider the unitary time evolution Vt of the
system, which is an internal one-parameter family of internal unitary operators
on H given by Vt|φ〉 = e−itT |φ〉.18 Note that these operators are defined for all
t ∈ ∗R.
4.2. Hyperfinite-dimensional models for standard state spaces. We now con-
sider how one might model the standard situation of an observable with con-
tinuous spectrum using a hyperfinite-dimensional state space as described in
the previous subsection.19 Before doing so, we need some preliminaries.
Definition 1. Fix a Hilbert space H with dense subspace M. We say that a
hyperfinite-dimensional subspace H of ∗H is adapted toM ifM ⊆ H ⊆ ∗M.
17Such probabilities merely satisfy “hypercountable” additivity instead of the usual count-
able additivity.
18There are a number of equivalent ways of interpreting the exponentiated operator here. For
example, one can view matrix exponentiation as a function
⋃
n∈NMn(C) → ⋃n∈NMn(C) and
then the above exponentiated operator is given by the nonstandard extension of this function.
19See Raab (2004) for a preliminary description of this example in the context of the standard
collapse theory.
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The following is a routine application of saturation:
Lemma 2. For any dense subspace M of a Hilbert space H, there is a hyperfinite-
dimensional subspace of ∗H adapted to M.20
Suppose now that H is adapted to M. Set EH : ∗H → H to be the internal or-
thogonal projection map. A routine “overflow” argument yields the following:
Lemma 3. For all |φ〉 ∈ H, EH|φ〉 ≈ |φ〉.21
Suppose further that T is an unbounded operator on H whose domain D(T)
contains M. Note that T extends to a map T : ∗D(T) → ∗H. Since H ⊆ ∗M ⊆
∗D(T), we can consider the restriction of T to H, namely T  H : H → ∗H.
In order to obtain an operator on H, we must compose this latter map with
the projection EH. Summarizing, we define the natural extension TH to be the
internal operator on H given by TH|φ〉 := (EH ◦ T)|φ〉. By the previous lemma,
we have that TH|φ〉 ≈ T |φ〉 for all |φ〉 ∈M. The next lemma is easy to prove:
Lemma 4. If T as above is symmetric, then so is TH (whence it is internally self-
adjoint).
Crucial for us is the following (see Proposition 2 in Raab (2004)):
Proposition 5. For each λ ∈ σ(T), there is λ ′ ∈ σ(TH) (that is, an internal eigenvalue
of TH) such that λ ≈ λ ′.
We now apply these preliminaries to the task at hand. Fix a Hilbert space H
(not necessarily separable), which is to represent the state space of our physical
system. Moreover, we fix an observable A, which is an unbounded self-adjoint
operator onHwith domainD(A), and the HamiltonianH of our system, which
is also an unbounded self-adjoint operator on H with domain D(H). Suppose
further that M is a dense subspace of H that is contained in D(A) ∩ D(H).22
Fix a hyperfinite-dimensional subspaceH of ∗H adapted toM and consider the
natural extensions AH and HH of A and H respectively.
20The uninitated readermay view this result as amore elaborate version of the statement that
there exist positive infinitesimal real numbers. The latter statement follows from an appropri-
ate saturation assumption together with the fact that given any finite collection of positive real
numbers, there is a positive real number smaller than all of them. Here, given any finite subset
of M, there is a finite-dimensional subspace of M containing all of them.
21The basic idea here is that the internal set of all n ∈ ∗N for which there exists |ψ〉 ∈ H such
that ‖|φ〉 − |ψ〉‖ < 1
n
contains the external set N (as H contains the dense subspace M of H).
Consequently, there must exist an infinite N in this set, whence the lemma follows.
22This already presupposes thatD(A)∩D(H) is a dense subspace ofH; we will add a further
restriction in a moment.
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One can connect the Everettian interpretation of the hyperfinite-dimensional
system (H, AH, HH) to anEverettian interpretation of the standard system (H, A,H)
in a natural way. Proposition 5 already suggests that how this might work. In-
deed, for each λ ∈ σ(A), a potential measurement result for the observable
A, there is an eigenvalue (that is, a determinate measurement) for the internal
observableAH that is infinitely close to λ, which wemay interpret as an approx-
imation to measuring λwith infinite precision. But there are further conditions
we would like to hold, namely:
(1) For standard states, the standard and internal unitary time evolutions
should be infinitely close to one another.
(2) Theprobabilistic interpretations affordedby the hyperfinitemodel should
agree (up to an infinitesimal difference) with the usual quantum me-
chanical probabilities associated to the standard system.
Before formulating a precise definition from these two conditions, we will say
a bit more about each.
Regarding (1), for each t ∈ R, set Ut to be the unitary operator on H given by
Ut := e
−itH.23 Also, for t ∈ ∗R, we can consider the internal unitary operator
Vt on H given by Vt := e−itHH .24 A precise formulation of condition (1) above
would be that Ut|φ〉 ≈ Vt|φ〉 for all |φ〉 ∈ D(H) and all t ∈ R, that is, for a
state in the domain of the Hamiltonian H (for which Ut does really solve the
time-dependent Schrödinger equation with initial state |φ〉), the standard and
internal unitary evolutions of the state remain infinitely close for all (standard)
time.
In connection with the previous paragraph, we say that an element |φ〉 ∈ ∗H is
nearstandard, and write |φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H), if there is |ψ〉 ∈ H such that |φ〉 ≈ |ψ〉.
In this case, we set st |φ〉 to denote this (necessarily unique) element ofH.
We now consider item (2). For each |φ〉 ∈ H and each Borel subset E ⊆ R, set
µA,|φ〉(E) to be the probability that a measurement of the observable A in the
state |φ〉 yields a result in the set E. Formally, µA,|φ〉(E) = 〈φ|PE|φ〉, where PE is
the projection-valued measure associated with the observable A applied to the
Borel set E. On the other hand, for |φ〉 ∈ H and internal F ⊆ ∗R, set µAH,|φ〉(F)
to be the internal probability that a measurement of the observable AH in the
state |φ〉 yields a result in the internal set F. By transfer, this is calculated by the
hyperfinite sum µAH,|φ〉(F) =
∑
{|αi|
2 : λi ∈ F}, where |φ〉 =
∑
i αi|ψi〉 is the
expansion of |φ〉 in terms of the eigenbasis {|ψi〉 : i ∈ I} fixed for AH. Note that
23Of course now the exponentiated operator is defined using the spectral theorem.
24One might be tempted to simply consider the natural extension (Ut)H ofUt, but in general
this need not be unitary.
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µAH,|φ〉 is indeed an internal finitely additive probability measure defined on the
internal subsets of ∗R.
Given our discussion of item (1) above and the fact that a measurement of AH
that belongs to st−1(E) should be viewed as approximating (with infinite preci-
sion) ameasurement ofA landing in E, a first guess as towhat (2)might require
is that, for each |φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H) and Borel subset E ⊆ R, we have µA,st |φ〉(E) ≈
µAH,|φ〉(st−1(E)). The issue with this is that st−1(E) is not generally an internal
subset of ∗R. However, writing En for the set of elements of ∗R within distance
1
n
of ∗E and noting that each En is internal, we see that st−1(E) =
⋂
n∈N>0 En is
Loeb measurable. Thus, a correct formalization of (2) above would ask that
µA,st |φ〉(E) = µ
AH,|φ〉
L (st−1(E)) for all |φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H) and all Borel subsets E ⊆ R.
We summarize this discussion with a definition:
Definition 6. Thehyperfinite-dimensional system (H, AH, HH) is a faithfulmodel
of the standard system (H, A,H) if the following two conditions hold:
(1) For each |φ〉 ∈ D(H) and each t ∈ R, we have Ut|φ〉 ≈ Vt|φ〉.
(2) For each |φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H) and each Borel subset E ⊆ R, we have
µA,st |φ〉(E) = µ
AH,|φ〉
L (st−1(E)).
Note that in a faithful model, by setting E := σ(A), we have that, for any state
|φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H), with µAH,|φ〉L -probability 1, a measurement result ofAH in the state
|φ〉 will yield a definite measurement that is infinitely close to an element of
σ(A).
In order to obtain a faithful model, a further technical assumption on M must
be made. This technical assumption does indeed hold in many cases of interest,
as we will discuss below.
We set
fin(H) := {|φ〉 ∈ H : ‖|φ〉‖ ∈ fin(∗R)}.
For |φ〉 ∈ fin(H), we note that |φ〉 7→ st ‖|φ〉‖ is a semi-norm on fin(H). We
also set mon(H) := {|φ〉 ∈ fin(H) : ‖|φ〉‖ ≈ 0} and ◦H := fin(H)/mon(H),
which is then a normed space under the norm induced by the above seminorm
on fin(H). If |φ〉 ∈ fin(H), we denote its class in ◦H by ◦|φ〉. For |φ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ fin(H),
note that 〈φ|ψ〉 ∈ fin(∗C) and thus the internal inner product onH descends to
an inner product on ◦Hdefined by 〈◦φ|◦ψ〉 := st〈φ|ψ〉. It follows from saturation
that ◦H is actually a Hilbert space, called the nonstandard hull ofH. Moreover,
since M is dense in H and EH|φ〉 ≈ |φ〉 for all |φ〉 ∈ H, it follows that the map
|φ〉 7→ ◦|φ〉 : H → ◦H is an embedding of Hilbert spaces; in what follows, one
identifiesH as a subspace of ◦H via this embedding.
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Suppose now that B is an internally self-adjoint operator onH. In Raab (2004),
the nonstandard hull of B is defined to be a certain self-adjoint operator ◦B on
◦H whose precise definition is given in terms of spectral theory. In the easy
case that B is finitely bounded, that is, when the internal operator norm ‖B‖ of
B is a finite element of ∗R (which rarely happens in quantum mechanics), we
have that B(fin(H)) ⊆ fin(H), whence one can define ◦B◦|φ〉 := ◦(B|φ〉). (This
definition does not even require B to be self-adjoint.)
Given a self-adjoint operatorA onH and an internally self-adjoint operatorB on
H, we say that B is a hull extension of A ifD(A) ⊆ D(◦B) and A|φ〉 = ◦B|φ〉 for
all |φ〉 ∈ D(A).25 The reason for being interested in hull extensions is given by
the following result, which follows from results in Raab (2004) andwith further
details presented in Goldbring (2021):
Theorem 7. Suppose that AH and HH are hull extensions of A and H respectively.
Then the hyperfinite-dimensional system (H, AH, HH) is a faithful model of the standard
system (H, A,H).
Raab (2004) also provides a condition for when the natural extension is a hull
extension. Recall that a core of an unbounded self-adjoint operatorA is a dense
subspaceM of its domain on which A  M is essentially self-adjoint.
Theorem 8. Suppose that A is a self-adjoint operator on H and that M is a core of
A. Then for any hyperfinite-dimensional subspace H of ∗H that is adapted to M, the
natural extension AH is a hull extension of A.
Summarizing the relationship between the standard and nonstandard models,
we have:
Theorem 9. Suppose that (H, A,H) is a standard system for which the observable A
and the Hamiltonian H share a common coreM. Then for any hyperfinite-dimensional
subspace H of ∗H adapted to M, the hyperfinite-dimensional system (H, AH, HH) is a
faithful model of (H, A,H).
There are many instances in which the common core assumption is satisfied.
For example, whenever the Hamiltonian H is a “small perturbation” of the ob-
servable A, then the common core assumption holds. Relevant theorems along
these lines are Wüst’s theorem and the Kato-Rellich theorem.26 We will study par-
ticular instances of these results when we study the motion of a particle in Rn
in Section 6.
25Raab calls such a B a nonstandard extension ofA, but we find this nomenclature confusing.
26See Chapter X of Reed and Simon (1975) for more details.
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The hyperfinite model arguably comes with surplus expressive power. In addi-
tion to the sort of states that one would want to be able to represent, the repre-
sentation allows for nonstandard states with curious properties. There are, for
example, states |φ〉 ∈ H such that µAH,|φ〉L (st−1(σ(A)) < 1. These are states for
which there is a positive probability of getting a measurement result λ ∈ σ(AH)
that may not belong to st−1(σ(A)). Such a λmay be a finite hyperreal, in which
case one would have a nonzero probability of measuring a value that is infin-
itely close to a real valuewhich itself could never have been a result ofmeasuring
A.27 On the other hand, such a λmay be infinite. In this case the corresponding
eigenstate |ψ〉would correspond to an infinite expectation value for the observ-
able. There is nothing inherently wrong with allowing for such a possibility
when it makes good physical sense. But sometimes it doesn’t.28
That said, there is little reason to worry about excessive expressive power of the
hyperfinite model in the context of a no-collapse formulation like Everettian
quantum mechanics. Here the nearstandard vector representing a nearstan-
dard global state always evolves infinitely close to the usual deterministic uni-
tary evolution and hence stays nearstandard. Consequently, states that make
good physical sense continue to make good physical sense under the dynamics.
Further, what worlds there are and what their states are at each time is fully
determined by the linear decomposition of nearstandard state in terms of the
eigenstates of one’s specified observable.29
5. Nonstandard formulations of Everett’s limiting properties
Everett considered the statistical limiting properties of pure wave mechanics
to be centrally important to his interpretation of the theory. He discussed this
point at a conference on the foundations of quantum mechanics at Xavier Uni-
versity in 1962. While the participants were most interested in talking about
branching worlds, Everett wanted to talk about his relative frequency and ran-
domness results. He began an extended monologue on the topic:
I’d like to make one final remark here. Imagine a very large se-
ries of experimentsmade by an observer. With each observation,
the state of the observer splits into a number of states, one for
each possible outcome, and correlated to the outcome. Thus the
27If σ(A) = R, as in the case of position or momentum, this possibility cannot arise.
28Such phenomena have been discussed in other nonstandard treatments of quantum me-
chanics. See, for example, Benci et. al. (2019).
29Compare this with Raab’s (2004) formulation of the standard collapse theory using non-
standardmethodswhere the dynamicsmay require collapses to nonstandard eigenstates where
there is no clear physical interpretation.
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state of the observer is a constantly branching tree, each element
of which describes a particular history of observations. Now, I
would like to assert that, for a “typical” branch, the frequency of
results will be precisely what is predicted by ordinary quantum
mechanics. (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 274–5)
To make this claim, Everett explained, one needs a measure over branches. He
chose the norm-squared coefficient measure on the grounds that is had a num-
ber of salient formal properties. He took his most significant achievement to be
in showing that, in thismeasure,measure one of the branches in the determinate-
record basiswill exhibit the standard quantum statistics in the limit as an infinite
number of measurements are made.
Everett had briefly sketched his argument for his relative frequency property in
the long version of his Ph.D. thesis (1956, 126–7) and in the much shorter ver-
sion of his thesis that he defended and was subsequently published as a stan-
dalone research paper (1957, 190–4). He had also, yet more briefly, sketched
an argument for a randomness property (1956, 127–8). These two properties to-
gether say that measure one of the branches will exhibit random sequences of
results exhibiting the usual quantum statistics in the limit as an infinite num-
ber of measurements are made.30 Hence, Everett concluded, “all predictions of
the usual theory will appear to be valid to the observer in almost all observer
states” (1957, 194). This is what it meant to him for his formulation of pure
wave mechanics to be empirically adequate.31
To see how this works in the context of the hyperfinite model, fix an infinite
elementK of ∗N and letH :=
⊗K
i=1
∗C2 denote the hyperfinite-dimensional space
that is the internal tensor product of K copies of ∗C2. This space allows one to
represent the composite system of the measuring device and the first K object
systems after K sequential measurements of x-spin. Suppose that each particle




ofH; here, ix denotes the internal cardinality of the set of those j = 1, . . . , K such
that x(j) = 1 (which represents x-spin up). Set λx := ixK for the relative frequency
of achieving x-spin up according to the branch x. We let B : H → H denote the
internal self-adjoint operator defined by B|x〉 := λx|x〉. Note that B is internally
bounded.
Letµ|ψ〉 denote the internal scalar-valued spectralmeasure corresponding to |ψ〉,




30See Hartle (1968) for an early discussion of the relative frequency property, and and Farhi,
Goldstone, and Gutmann (1989) for a proof. See Barrett (1999) for a discussion of the experi-
mental setup and both the relative-frequency and randomness properties.
31See Barrett (2015) for a discussion of how Everett thought of empirical adequacy.
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let µ|ψ〉L denote the corresponding Loeb measure. We also let ◦B : ◦H → ◦H
denote the corresponding nonstandard hull map (as defined in the previous
section) with scalar-valued spectral measure ν◦|ψ〉.
The following theorem is the nonstandard reformulation of Everett’s relative
frequency theorem:32
Theorem 10. Using the above notation, we have µ|ψ〉L ({x ∈ 2K : λx ≈ α2}) = 1,
whence ν◦|ψ〉({α2}) = 1. Consequently, ◦|ψ〉 is an eigenvector of ◦B with eigenvalue α2.
The argument for the nonstandard interpretation of Everett’s randomness the-
orem is relatively straightforward. Fix infinite K ∈ ∗N and consider the “restric-
tion map” f : 2K → 2N which restricts a hyperfinite sequence of 0’s and 1’s to
its initial segment indexed by standard natural numbers. Consider 2K equipped
with the Loeb measure µL associated with the internal product measure on 2K
while we consider 2N with its usual Lebesgue measure (that is, infinite product
measure) m. It is not hard to verify that the pushforward of µL along f is pre-
cisely m. Consequently, if we repeat our measurement K times as above, then
the total measure, as determined by µL, that our sequence x belongs to f−1(E) for
any Lebesgue null subset E of 2N is 0. In particular, if E is the set of nonrandom
sequences, with respect to any standard criterion for what it means for such a
sequence to be nonrandom, then Ewill be countable and thus be Lebesgue null.
Hence almost all sequences in measure µL will satisfy any standard criterion for
being random.33
As a simple concrete example of the relative frequency and randomness prop-
erties, consider an observer who repeats an x-spin measurement on an ω se-
quence of particles each prepared in state (1) above. The two basic limiting
properties in the context of the hyperfinite model entail that measure one of the
branches, in measure µL, will exhibit the standard quantum relative frequencies
with |α|2 proportion of the results being “↑x” and |β|2 proportion of the results
being “↓x” and with no computationally specifiable pattern. Since measure one
of the worlds will exhibit the standard quantum statistics with randomly dis-
tributed results, the standard quantum predictions will hold in a typical world
(in the sense of typical given by measure µL).
We now prove a continuous spectrum version of Everett’s relative frequency
theorem.
32This theorem follows the same line of argument as the theorem for the standard case. See
Barrett (1999, 100–4).
33See Barrett (1999, 104–5) for this theorem in the standard context andBarrett andHuttegger
(2019) for an extended discussion of quantum randomness.
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Suppose that the hyperfinite-dimensional system (H, AH, HH) is a faithfulmodel
of (H, A,H). We adopt the same notation as in the previous section. Fix |φ〉 ∈
ns(∗H) and infiniteK ∈ ∗N. Let ζK,|φ〉 denote the internal measure on IK obtained
by taking the internal product measure of the measure µAH,|φ〉. (This is the in-
ternal notion of typicality here.) Also, let ηKL denote the Loeb measure on [1, K]
coming from counting measure as described in Section 3. For each y ∈ IK and
Borel set F ⊆ R, let XF,y := {j ∈ [1, K] : λy(j) ∈ st−1(F)}. Note that each XF,y is a
Loeb measurable subset of [1, K].
Theorem 11. Fix |φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H). Then for sufficiently large infinite K ∈ ∗N, we have
the following: for every Borel set F ⊆ R, we have that ηKL(XF,K,y) = µA,st |φ〉(F) for
ζ
K,|φ〉
L -almost all y ∈ IK.
Proof. Fix infinitesimal ε > 0. For K ∈ ∗N, y ∈ IK, and internally Borel E ⊆ ∗R,
set
XE,K,y := {j ∈ [1, K] : λy(j) ∈ E}.
Note that each XE,K,y is internal. Furthermore, let ZK consist of those y ∈ IK
such that | |XE,K,y|
K
− µAH,|φ〉(E)| < ε for all internally Borel sets E ⊆ ∗R. Then by
transferring the classical Everett limiting theorem, there is K0 ∈ ∗N such that,
for all K ≥ K0, we have that ζK,|φ〉(ZK) > 1−ε. For each Borel set F ⊆ R and each
m ∈ ∗N (finite or infinite), let Fm := {λ ∈ ∗R : dist(λ, ∗F) < 1m }. Since XF,K,y =⋂∞
m=1 XFm,K,y, we have that ηKL(XF,K,y) ≈ ηK(XFM,K,y) for any infiniteM ∈ ∗N. If
y ∈ ZK, then ηK(XFM,K,y) ≈
|XFM,K,Y |
K
≈ µAH,|φ〉(FM). Since st−1(F) =
⋂∞
m=1 Fm, we
have that µA,st |φ〉(F) = µAH,|φ〉L (st−1(F)) ≈ µAH,|φ〉(FM).
Putting this all together, we have that ηKL(XF,K,y) = µA,st |φ〉(F) for all y ∈ ZK. Since
ζ
K,|φ〉
L (ZK) = 1, we may conclude. 
In the statement of the theorem, how large K needs to be chosen may depend
on the state |φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H), that is, using the notation from the proof, the value
of K0 may depend on |φ〉. Setting K|φ〉 for this value of K0 dependent on |φ〉, it is
readily verified that K|φ〉 = Kst |φ〉. Consequently, if the nonstandard extension is
sufficiently saturated, then by choosingK0 ∈ ∗N greater thanK|φ〉 for all |φ〉 ∈ H,
we see that the conclusion of the theorem holds for any K ≥ K0, independent of
the choice of |φ〉 ∈ ns(∗H).
In the next section, wewill see an illustration of the limiting property just proven
in the case of an observable with continuous spectrum.
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6. An example: motion of a particle in Rn
In this section, we show how the hyperfinite representation works for a partic-
ular concrete example, namely for the motion of a single particle in Rn. In this
case, H := L2(Rn) and our observable A under consideration will be Xj, the
operator which multiplies a function by the variable xj, for some j = 1, . . . , n.
This operator corresponds to observing the jth-coordinate of the position of the
particle. The Hamiltonian for our system is given by H := − h̄
2m
∆+V(~X), where
∆ is the n-dimensional Laplacian, ~X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is the vector consisting of
the various position operators, and V : Rn → R is some function (whence V(~X)
represents the potential energy).
We briefly discuss some natural conditions on which A and H satisfy the com-
mon core assumption. A theorem of Kato (which follows from the aforemen-
tioned Kato-Rellich Theorem) states that if n ≤ 3 and V : Rn → R belongs to
L2(Rn) + L∞(Rn), then any core for ∆ is a core for the Hamiltonian H. A more
general version of Kato’s theorem holds for dimension n ≥ 4 if the assumption
V ∈ L2(Rn) + L∞(Rn) is replaced with V ∈ Lp(Rn) + L∞(Rn) for some p > n
2
.
Since C∞c (Rn), the space of smooth functions on Rn with compact support, is a
core for ∆ as well as any Xj, we thus have many natural potential functions for
which our common core assumption holds.34
From now on, we fix a potential function V for which A andH share a common
core M. We fix a hyperfinite-dimensional subspace H of ∗H that is adapted to
M. Suppose that (|ψi〉)i∈I is an internal orthonormal eigenbasis for AH with
corresponding eigenvalues (λi)i∈I. Consequently, these λi ∈ ∗R represent the
possible measurement outcomes when measuring AH. According to Proposi-
tion 5 above, for each λ ∈ σ(A) = R, there is some i ∈ I such that λ ≈ λi. That
is, the measurement outcome λi forAH should be thought of as an approximate
measurement (with infinite precision) corresponding to a measurement of the
jth coordinate of the particle being λ. Each |ψi〉, being an actual eigenvector of
AH, is such thatAH|ψi〉−λi|ψi〉 is orthogonal to every vector inH. In particular,
since H contains M, which is a dense subspace of L2(R), we see that |ψi〉 must
behave like a Dirac function with jth coordinate function positioned at λi.
Fix some initial (standard) state |φ〉 ∈ H = L2(R) of the particle and write
|φ〉 =
∑




i | = 1). Suppose we then
let the particle evolve according to the internal unitary evolution Vt := e−itHH .
Given some t ∈ ∗R, we may then consider the internal state of the system at
34See Chapter X of Reed and Simon (1975) for more examples of when the common core
assumption holds.
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time t, namely









In the last step, we have rewritten the evolved state in terms of the eigenbasis for
AH. Recall also that for standard time t ∈ R, the above φ(t)〉 will be infinitely
close to the standard evolution Ut|φ〉 of our original state |φ〉.
Suppose an observer now makes a measurement. The relative observer whose
system state is |ψi〉would get the determinate result λi. For aµAH,|ψ(t)〉L -measure 1
set of worlds, such λi belongs to fin(R) and represents an approximatemeasure-
ment of the jth position of the particle being st(λi), where this approximatemea-
surement has infinite precision. Moreover, by Theorem 11 above, if one repeats
this measurement a sufficiently large hyperfinite number of times, the relative
frequency of landing infinitely close to any particular Borel set agrees with the
standard quantum statistical measure µA,| stφ(t)〉 of that Borel set. Further, the
particular sequence of results will pass any standard test for randomness for
almost all relative sequences in the norm-squared measure. Finally, the global
state |φ(t)〉 evolves according to the internal dynamics V at all times with the
local states of the worlds determined by the nonstandard decomposition of the
state.
7. discussion
The present hyperfinite model has a number of features that Everett would
have found compelling. It allows one to understand the global state as a set
of branches corresponding to the eigenvalues of a continuous-valued observ-
able. The measure associated with the set of branches behaves in a natural way
akin to what one might expect from a probability measure over a finite set. In-
deed, the hyperfinite-dimensional state space behaves very much like a finite-
dimensional state space. This makes operations like forming linear combina-
tions of states and calculating probabilities particularly intuitive. The model
gives values infinitesimally close to the standard quantum probabilities when
the probabilities are finite. It is also possible for a branch to be associated with
an infinitesimal probability. Conveniently, these sum just like finite probabili-
ties. And the hyperfinite model allows for a straightforward formulation of the
standard unitary quantum dynamics.
There is a close connection between the standard and the hyperfinite models.
Specifically, as we have proven here, the latter provides a faithful representa-
tion of the former. The standard model, then, guides one in understanding the
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physical content of the nonstandard model. While the hyperfinite model ar-
guably has more expressive power than one needs, nearstandard states remain
nearstandard under the dynamics and hence continue to make good physical
sense.
In addition to providing an intuitive picture of hyperfinitely many worlds, we
have shown how one might prove versions of Everett’s statistical limiting prop-
erties in the hyperfinite model. The result is that the norm-squared measure
of the resulting branches that will exhibit the standard random quantum sta-
tistics in the limit as one performs an unbounded sequence of measurements is
one. Hence, the statistical predictions of the standard collapse formulation of
quantummechanics will appear to be valid in almost all of the hyperfinitemany
worlds in this measure.
In brief, the hyperfinite model provides a way to think of a set of worlds that
represent a continuous spectrum of measurement outcomes and for which one
can prove versions of his limiting results. In this regard, it satisfies the con-
ditions that Everett stipulated at the Xavier conference. Finally, it provides an
intuitive framework in which to consider no-collapse formulations of quantum
mechanics more generally.35
35We would like to thank Chip Sebens, Daniel Whiteson, and Peter Byrne for comments on
an earlier version of this paper.
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